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Abstract12
We investigate the effects of fiscal policy communication on the propagation
of government spending shocks. To this aim, we propose a new index meas-
uring the coordination effects of policy communication on private agents’ ex-
pectations. This index is based on the disagreement amongst US professional
forecasters about future government spending. The underlying intuition is
that a clear fiscal policy communication can coalesce expectations, reducing
disagreement. Results indicate that, in times of low disagreement, the out-
put response to fiscal spending innovations is positive and large, mainly due
to private investment response. Conversely, periods of elevated disagreement
are characterised by muted output response.
Keywords: Disagreement, Government spending shock, Fiscal transmission13
mechanism.14
JEL Classification: E60, D80.15
We would like to thank the Editor, the Associate Editor and one anonymous referee for their helpful comments.
We would also like to thank Silvia Miranda Agrippino, Carlo Altavilla, Gianni Amisano, Rüdiger Bachmann, Michael F.
Bryan, Antonello d’Agostino, Enrico d’Elia, Thorsten Drautzburg, Keith Kuester, Michele Lenza, Thomas Warmedinger,
Tao Zha - and the participants at an ECB seminar, at the Banca d’Italia 2014 Fiscal Workshop and at the Philadelphia
Fed’s 2014 Conference on Real-Time Data Analysis - for useful comments and discussions. We are also grateful to Nicholas
Bloom for providing us with the fiscal subcomponents of the Policy Uncertainty index in Baker et al. (2012). The opinions
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the the European Central Bank and the
Eurosystem.
Preprint submitted to Journal of Monetary Economics 29th June 2016
1. Introduction16
The impact of economic policy decisions depends, to a great extent, on17
how they are communicated and affect agents’ expectations, and hence their18
actions. Indeed, private agents can form expectations about the future course19
of fiscal policy by combining information conveyed by government announce-20
ments and privately collected information. In an economic system with dis-21
persed information where the government has potentially superior informa-22
tion on its procedures, forecasts and policy plans, policymakers can coordin-23
ate private agents’ beliefs and reduce disagreement by releasing additional24
information about current and future policies.25
This paper focuses on the expectation coordination effects of fiscal policy26
communication and provides an empirical assessment of the implications of27
disagreement amongst agents for the transmission of fiscal impulses in the28
United States. We develop an indirect measure of precision of fiscal policy29
communication derived from forecasters’ disagreement on the future path30
of federal fiscal spending, based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters31
(SPF). The underlying intuition is that a clear fiscal policy communication32
can coalesce private sector expectations on future policy measures, which in33
turn reduces agents’ disagreement. Based on this, we formulate our empirical34
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strategy consistently with the implications of imperfect information models35
(see Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Woodford, 2002, Sims, 2003 and Reis, 2006a,b)36
by structuring it in the three following steps.37
First, in order to pin down the fluctuations in disagreement that are due38
to policy communication and not to cyclical macroeconomic disturbances, we39
project the cross sectional dispersion of forecasts about future government40
spending onto the disagreement about current output. Second, following41
Ricco (2015), we identify fiscal spending shocks using individual revision of42
expectations at different horizons in US Survey of Professional Forecasters43
(SPF) data which we name ‘fiscal news’. In doing this, we recognise that44
the presence of information frictions crucially modifies the econometric iden-45
tification problem of fiscal shocks.2 Third, we estimate an Expectational46
Threshold VAR (ETVAR) model using Bayesian techniques, where the prox-47
ies for fiscal news shocks are included together with a number of macroeco-48
nomic variables. The threshold variable is our disagreement index, and the49
threshold level is endogenously estimated.50
Our results provide evidence that, during periods of high disagreement on51
2In the presence of imperfect information, new information is only partially absorbed
over time. Therefore, average forecast errors are likely to be a combination of both current
and past structural shocks and cannot be thought of as being, per se, a good proxy for
structural innovations (as, for example, proposed in Ramey, 2011).
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fiscal policy, spending shocks have weak effects on the economy. Conversely,52
in periods of low disagreement, the output response to the spending news53
shock is positive, strong and significantly different from zero, reaching a cu-54
mulative medium-term multiplier of about 2.7 after 16 quarters. Our analysis55
also shows that the stronger stimulative effects in times of low disagreement56
are mainly the result of an accelerator effect of planned fiscal spending on57
investment. During the low disagreement regime, the Federal Reserve tends58
to be more reactive to spending increases than in periods of high disagree-59
ment. Overall, our analysis highlights the case for policy signalling as a tool60
to reduce disagreement and enhance the impact of spending shocks.61
Our results speak to the literature on fiscal foresight (see Ramey, 2011,62
Leeper et al., 2012 and Leeper et al., 2013), and on state-dependent effects of63
fiscal policy (see, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012, Owyang64
et al., 2013 and Caggiano et al., 2014).65
However, differently form these works, our paper connects to the recent66
literature on imperfect information and on the formation of economic ex-67
pectations (see, amongst others, Mankiw et al., 2004, Dovern et al., 2012,68
Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010, 2012, Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013 and69
Andrade et al., 2014). In fact, we employ an identification scheme of fiscal70
3
shocks that is coherent with the implications of imperfect information mod-71
els and use expectational data in order to study the effects of disagreement72
amongst agents. Importantly, we focus on the role of public signals in re-73
ducing disagreement and in coordinating expectations. To the best of our74
knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt to study how different levels of75
precisions in fiscal policy communication affect the transmission mechanism76
of fiscal shocks, through disagreement.77
In doing that we also relate to the literature on policy communication.78
The analysis of the trade-offs underlying the provision of public signals by79
policy-makers to an economy in which agents have dispersed information was80
pioneered by Morris and Shin (2003a,b) in the context of monetary policy.381
Differently from this literature, our paper focuses on fiscal policy and provides82
stylised empirical facts on the implication of increased transparency, without83
studying the relation between public and private signal from a welfare per-84
spective. In this respect, it is more closely related to Melosi (2012) that85
proposes an econometric study of a signalling channel of monetary policy.86
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the properties of87
3More recent theoretical contributions have been proposed, amongst others, by Ange-
letos et al. (2006), Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010), Hachem and Wu (2014), Frenkel and
Kartik (2015).
4
expectational data on US fiscal spending. Section 3 is devoted to the con-88
struction of the fiscal policy disagreement index used in this paper. Section89
4 comments on the identification of fiscal shocks. Section 5 illustrates our90
Bayesian Threshold VAR model. Section 6 presents our main results and91
provides insights on the transmission channels. Finally, Section 7 concludes.92
2. Forecasting Fiscal Spending93
In the Philadelphia Fed’s quarterly SPF, professional forecasters are asked94
to provide expected values of a set of 32 macroeconomic variables for both95
the present quarter (nowcast) and up to four quarters ahead (forecast). SPF96
forecasters do not know the current value of these macroeconomic variables,97
which are only released with a lag. The panelists’ information set includes98
the BEA’s advance report data, which contains the first estimate of GDP99
(and its components) for the previous quarter. The deadline for responses is100
the second to third week of the middle month of each quarter.4101
For ‘real federal government consumption expenditures and gross invest-102
ment’, the main series of interest in this work, professional forecasters’ in-103
4The Survey does not report the number of experts involved in each forecast or the
forecasting method used. Professional forecasters are mostly private firms in the financial
sector. On average, in the sample, there are 29 respondents per period of which 22 appear
in consecutive periods.
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Figure 1: Government Spending Expected Growth rates – Fan Chart.
The figure plots the SPF median expected growth rate for the current quarter
and for the four future quarters, together with forecasters’ disagreement up to one
standard deviation (orange), and the realised growth reates (blue). Grey shaded
areas indicate the NBER Business Cycle contraction dates. Vertical lines indicate
the dates of the announcement of important fiscal and geopolitical events (teal),
presidential elections (black), and the Ramey-Shapiro war dates (red).
dividual responses have been collected from 1981Q3 to 2012Q4. Figure 1104
reports the median expected growth rate of federal spending for the current105
quarter and for the four quarters ahead, together with forecasters’ disagree-106
ment (the cross-sectional standard deviation of individual forecasts) and the107
historically realised growth rates.108
6
Some features of the SPF’s survey data on fiscal spending are noteworthy109
and common to the forecasts of other macroeconomic variables. As is evident110
in Figure 1, expectations about fiscal spending are more stable than the111
actual series. Expectations are sluggish in that they typically underestimate112
the movements of the forecast variable, despite being able to capture low113
frequency movements. Moreover, experts’ forecasts exhibit predictable errors114
and can be Granger-predicted (see Ricco, 2015). Experts disagree as they115
report different predictions at different forecast horizons and when updating116
their forecasts. The extent of their disagreement evolves over time (see Figure117
1 and discussion in Section 4). Finally, forecast revisions at different horizons118
for a given event in time are positively correlated.119
The above facts are broadly consistent with professional forecasters’ data120
being generated in a model of imperfect information rational expectations.121
In fact, imperfect information models in the form of delayed-information or122
noisy-information are able to account for at least three important features123
of expectational data: the presence of disagreement, the forecastability of124
errors, and the autocorrelation of expectation revisions. As shown by Coibion125
and Gorodnichenko (2010), the latter can be used to evaluate the implied126
7
degree of information rigidity.5127
3. Disagreement over Fiscal Policy128
We propose an index of precision of fiscal policy communication derived129
from the forecasters’ disagreement on the future path of fiscal spending. The130
underlying intuition is that a clear fiscal policy communication can coalesce131
private sector expectations on future policy measures, which in turn reduces132
agents’ disagreement. Conversely, higher than average disagreement about133
future government spending reveals poor communication from the govern-134
ment about the future stance of fiscal policies.135
Developing this idea, we focus on the component of the disagreement136
among forecasters about the future federal spending developments that is137
orthogonal to the disagreement about current macroeconomic conditions.138
The resulting index has three main features: (1) it relies on expectational139
real time ex-ante data only; (2) it is linearly uncorrelated with the business140
cycle; (3) it is fully non-judgmental. Moreover, it is consistent with our141
definition of fiscal shocks that are extracted from the same expectational142
dataset, and on a similar time horizon.143
5In our sample, the serial correlation between forecast revisions is around 0.2, implying
a degree of information rigidity of 0.8.
8
To construct the index for fiscal policy disagreement, a two-step procedure144
is followed. First, the time-varying cross-sectional standard deviation of the145
SPF forecasts (disagreement) for real federal government spending is com-146
puted at the four-quarters horizon. Second, the component of disagreement147
related to discretionary policy is extracted by projecting the disagreement148
among forecasters about the future development of fiscal spending onto the149
disagreement about the current macroeconomic conditions. This is done in150
order to address the issue of exogeneity with respect to the macroeconomic151
cycle. We think of this component as affected by the policy communication152
regime.153
We justify this procedure (i) theoretically, using a simple noisy-information154
model to discuss under which assumptions the index obtained could be cor-155
rectly thought of as an approximation of the agents’ disagreement about the156
discretionary fiscal spending and (ii) empirically, matching this index with a157
historical narrative.158
3.1. Disagreement in a Stylised Noisy-information Model159
A simple noisy-information model with Bayesian learning can help in160
more precisely defining the concepts used and in clarifying the assumptions161
underlying our approach. A stylised reduced form equation that decomposes162
9
government spending into a discretionary component and an automatic one163
can be written as164
gt = µg + g
d
t + κyt−1 , (1)
where µg is a constant, gdt is the discretionary component of fiscal spending165
and the term κyt−1 represent the (lagged) systematic response of fiscal spend-166
ing to business cycle fluctuations. Similarly to Lahiri and Sheng (2010), we167
assume that each agent i, at each quarter t, receives a public signal from168
the policymaker that is informative about the future growth of discretionary169
fiscal spending, gdt+h, at horizon h170
nt+h = g
d
t+h + ηt,h , ηt,h ∼ N
(
0, σ2(η)t,h
)
. (2)
Agents complement the information carried by the public signal using other171
sources of information. That is, they receive a private signal or a signal172
obtained by random sampling from diffuse information publicly available,173
i.e.,174
sit+h = g
d
t+h + ζ
i
t,h , ζ
i
t,h ∼ N
(
0, σ2(ζ)i,t,h
)
. (3)
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Without loss of generality, we can assume that the public and the private sig-175
nals are independent. Each forecaster combines the two signals, via Bayesian176
updating, to form conditional expectations for gdt+h:177
ĝdi,t+h = Ei
[
gdt+h|nt+h, sit+h
]
=
σ2(η)t,hs
i
t+h + σ
2
(ζ)i,t,hnt+h
σ2(ζ)i,t,h + σ
2
(η)t,h
. (4)
The disagreement at time t amongst forecasters about discretionary fiscal
spending at time t+ h can be defined as:
Dt(gdt+h) ≡ E
 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
ĝdi,t+h −
1
N
N∑
j=1
ĝdj,t+h
)2
=
σ2(η)t,h
N
N∑
i=1
σ2(ζ)i,t,h
σ2(ζ)i,t,h + σ
2
(η)t,h
(
1− 1
N − 1
N∑
j 6=i
σ2(ζ)j,t,h
σ2(ζ)j,t,h + σ
2
(η)t,h
)
, (5)
where ĝi,t+h is the individual forecast defined in equation (4). From Eq.178
(5), it is clear that when the precision of the public signal (the inverse of179
its variance) goes to infinity, the disagreement amongst agents goes to zero.180
Therefore, variations in the precision of the public signal are reflected in the181
variations of agents’ disagreement over time. We think of the variance of182
the public signal on discretionary spending as dependent on the willingness183
of the policymaker to blur or clarify the policy indication, as well as the184
11
policymaker’s credibility.6185
In our empirical analysis, we conceive the policy communication as roughly186
having two ‘polar’ regimes: high and low precision. While fluctuations of187
disagreement may be due to the endogenous dynamics of absorption of new188
information, as suggested by delayed-information models, we think of shifts189
in disagreement as a reflection of policy communication regimes.190
3.2. Cyclical Variations in Disagreement191
In order to pin down fluctuations in government spending disagreement192
that are due to policy communication and not due to cyclical macroeconomic193
disturbances, we need to control for variations of disagreement along the194
business cycle. In fact, it has been documented that disagreement about GDP195
growth strongly intensifies during recessions and reduces during expansions196
(see Dovern et al., 2012). For a linearised reduced form equation for output197
of the following form, which we might think as derived from a structural198
model199
yt = µy +
n∑
i=1
cnyt−i +
m∑
j=0
djg
d
t+j + at , (6)
6The precision of the privately extracted signal, possibly using diffused information,
may depend on the information system, the policy decision process and institutional frame-
work. We assume that, over the period of study, fluctuations in the precisions of the private
signals are small compared to the variations in the variance of the public signal.
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where the first sum is an autoregressive component of output up to lag n,200
the second is the sum of the output responses to the path of fiscal spending201
up to horizon m (the maximum horizon on which the government is able to202
release information) and at is a combination of macroeconomic shocks. The203
disagreement about total government spending (the observed quantity) is204
Dt(gt+1) = (1 + d1κ)Dt(gdt+1) + κ2Dt(yt) . (7)
Hence, by regressing the disagreement amongst forecasters about the future205
development of fiscal spending onto the disagreement about current mac-206
roeconomic conditions, one can extract a measure of disagreement about207
discretionary policy measures.7208
In light of the considerations made above, we regress the disagreement209
7Regressing Dt(gt+1) onto Dt(yt) can generate an endogeneity issue due to the fact
that the residual in Eq. 7 may be correlated with the regressor. However, for our purpose,
the bias introduced is likely to be small. A simple dimensional argument provides the
intuition for this. Regressing log(Dt(gt+1)) onto log(Dt(yt)), one would find
κˆ2 =
Cov(log(Dt(gt+1)), log(Dt(yt)))
Var(log(Dt(yt))) = κ
2 + (1 + d1κ)d
2
1
Var(log(Dt(gdt+1)))
Var(log(Dt(yt))) . (8)
We can assess the order of magnitude of the second term observing that - based on SPF
historical data - the ratio of disagreement on current output over disagreement on future
government spending is around 10−1, hence the constant d21 (the output multiplier of a
quarter ahead increase in fiscal spending) has to be of order 10−2. Hence, we conclude
that the bias is at most of order 10−2, while κ2 is likely to be of order one.
13
of the forecasts on real government spending for the four quarters ahead -210
measured as the log of the cross-sectional standard deviation - on the log-211
disagreement of the forecasts on current GDP, its lags, and a constant. In212
doing this, we assume that forecasts of future government spending do not213
incorporate information about other macroeconomic shocks affecting future214
but not current GDP. Our fiscal policy disagreement index is thus obtained by215
exponentiating and standardising the regression residuals. By construction,216
these residuals are linearly uncorrelated with the disagreement about current217
macroeconomic conditions.8218
3.3. Policy Disagreement219
Our fiscal policy disagreement index is reported in Figure 2. It appears220
to well track a narrative of the main events surrounding the management221
of fiscal policy in the US since the 1980s. The first peak coincides with the222
announcement of the “Star Wars” programme by Reagan in 1983Q1. The223
index then rises with the 1984 presidential elections and following the fiscal224
activism of President Reagan’s second term. The next spike in disagreement225
is related to the fall of the Berlin wall. In the 1990s, the index shows increases226
8As a robustness check, we have also added the dispersion of the forecasts on current
unemployment and CPI inflation to the regressors. Results (not shown, available upon
request) are broadly unchanged.
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in disagreement generated by the presidential elections, the change from a227
Republican to a Democratic administration, the ‘federal shutdown’ in 1995,228
and the war in Kosovo. In the 2000s, the disagreement index spikes in relation229
to the war in Afghanistan and the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts, followed by230
the Gulf War, Iraq War troop surge, the 2008 and 2009 stimulus acts and,231
finally, the ‘Debt Ceiling Crisis’ of 2011.232
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Figure 2: Policy Disagreement Index - Time series of the fiscal policy disagree-
ment index based on the dispersion of SPF forecasts (black). Grey shaded areas
indicate the NBER business cycle contraction dates. Vertical lines indicate the
dates of the announcement of important fiscal and geopolitical events (teal), pres-
idential elections (black), and the Ramey-Shapiro war dates (red). The thick red
dashed line indicate the TVAR endogenous threshold.
4. Fiscal News233
We identify fiscal shocks using SPF forecast revisions of federal govern-
ment consumption and investment forecasts, which can be thought of as fiscal
15
news. The h quarters ahead forecast error can be decomposed into the flow
of fiscal news, which updates the agents’ information set It over time:
gt − E∗t−hgt︸ ︷︷ ︸
forecast error
h periods ahead
= (gt − E∗tgt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nowcast error
6∈ It
+ (E∗tgt − E∗t−1gt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nowcast revision
(news at t) ∈ It
+ . . .
· · ·+ (E∗t−h+1gt − E∗t−hgt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
forecast revision
(news at t-h+1) ∈ It−h+1
. (9)
where E∗ is the agents’ expectation operator and g is government spending234
growth. The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the nowcast235
error, which can be thought of as a proxy for agents’ misexpectations which236
can be revealed only at a later date (at least after a quarter). The other com-237
ponents (nowcast and forecast revisions) can be seen as proxies for the fiscal238
news, which are related to current and future realisations of fiscal spending,239
and are received by the agents and incorporated into their expectations.240
We define two measures of fiscal news in the aggregate economy that241
are both related to the revision of expectations of the government spending242
growth rate in the current quarter and in the future 3 quarters (the maximum243
16
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Figure 3: Government Spending News – Fan Chart. The figure plots the mean
implied SPF news on the current quarter and for future quarters, together with
forecast disagreement up to one standard deviation. Grey shaded areas indicate
the NBER Business Cycle contraction dates. Vertical lines indicate the dates of
the announcement of important fiscal and geopolitical events (teal), presidential
elections (black), and the Ramey-Shapiro war dates (red).
horizon available in the data):244
Nt(0) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E∗it gt − E∗it−1gt
)
, (10)
Nt(1, 3) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
3∑
h=1
(
E∗it gt+h − E∗it−1gt+h
)
, (11)
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where i is the index of individual forecasters. Figure 3 plots the mean implied245
SPF news on the current quarter and for future quarters, together with fore-246
caster disagreement up to one standard deviation. In the empirical analysis247
which follows, we use these two news measures, labelled as nowcast revision248
(equation 10) and forecast revision (equation 11), respectively.249
The identification of fiscal shocks using expectation revisions is consist-250
ent with an imperfect information framework. As observed in Coibion and251
Gorodnichenko (2010), in more general models of imperfect information, the252
average ex-post forecast errors across agents and the average ex-ante forecast253
revisions are related by the following expression:254
gt − E∗t−hgt︸ ︷︷ ︸
forecast error
=
λ
1− λ
(
E∗t−hgt − E∗t−h−1gt
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
forecast revision (news)
+ut−h+1,t , (12)
where λ is the parameter of information rigidity (λ = 0 in the case of full255
information), E∗t−hxt is the average forecast at time t − h, and ut−h+1,t is a256
linear combination of rational expectations errors from time t− h to time t.257
Hence, conditional on the past information set, the revision of expectations258
is informative about structural innovations. In fact, from Equation (12) one259
readily obtains:260
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(
E∗t−hgt − E∗t−h−1gt
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
news at t-h
= λ
(
E∗t−h−1gt − E∗t−h−2gt
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
news at t-h-1
+(1− λ)ut−h . (13)
In particular, we will think of the parameter of information rigidity related261
to fiscal spending as having two possible values, λL and λH , reflecting the262
policy communication regime.263
5. A Bayesian Threshold VAR264
In order to study the effects of policy communication in the transmis-265
sion of fiscal shocks, we estimate a Threshold Vector-Autoregressive (TVAR)266
model with two endogenous regimes. In the TVARmodel, regimes are defined267
with respect to the level of our fiscal spending disagreement index (high and268
low disagreement). A threshold VAR is well suited to provide stylised facts269
about the signalling effects of fiscal policy and to capture difference in re-270
gimes with high and low disagreement. Moreover, the possibility of regime271
shifts after the spending shock allow us to account for possible dependency272
of the propagation mechanism on the size and the sign of the shock itself.273
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Following Tsay (1998), a two-regime TVAR model can be defined as274
yt = Θ(γ−τt−d)
(
C l + Al(L)yt−1 + εlt
)
+Θ(τt−d−γ)
(
Ch + Ah(L)yt−1 + εht
)
,
(14)
where Θ(x) is an Heaviside step function, i.e. a discontinuous function whose275
value is zero for a negative argument and one for a positive argument. The276
TVAR model allows for the possibility of two regimes (high and low dis-277
agreement), with different dynamic coefficients {Ci, Aij}i={l,h} and variance278
of the shocks {Σiε}i={l,h}. Regimes are determined by the level of a threshold279
variable τt with respect to an unobserved threshold level γ. In our case, the280
delay parameter d is assumed to be a known parameter and equal to one, in281
order to check for the role of the communication regime in place right before282
the shock hits the economy.9283
We estimate the TVAR model using Bayesian technique and the stand-284
ard Minnesota and sum-of-coefficients prior proposed in the macroeconomic285
literature. The adoption of these priors has been shown to improve the286
forecasting performance of VAR models, effectively reducing the estimation287
9The baseline TVAR model is estimated with 3 lags. Results are, however, robust if 2
or 4 lags are included. Longer lag polynomial are not advisable due to the relatively short
time series available.
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error while introducing only relatively small biases in the estimates of the288
parameters (e.g., Banbura et al., 2010).289
The TVAR model specified in Eq. (14) can be estimated by maximum290
likelihood. It is convenient to first concentrate {Ci, Aij,Σiε}i={l,h}, i.e., to hold291
γ (and d) fixed and estimate the constrained MLE for {Ci, Aij,Σiε}i={l,h}.292
In fact, conditional on the threshold value γ, the model is linear in the293
parameters of the model {Ci, Aij,Σiε}i={l,h}. Since {εit}i={l,h} are assumed to294
be Gaussian, and the Bayesian priors are conjugate prior distributions, the295
Maximum Likelihood estimators can be obtained by using least squares. The296
threshold parameter can be estimated, using non-informative flat priors, as297
γˆ = arg max logL(γ) = arg min log |Σ̂ε(γ)| , (15)
where L is the Gaussian likelihood (see Hansen and Seo, 2002). Details298
on the Bayesian priors adopted, on the criteria applied for the choice of the299
hyperparameters and on the estimation procedure are provided in the on-line300
appendix.301
Our baseline TVAR model includes the SPF implied fiscal news, the mean302
SPF forecast of GDP growth for the current quarter and four quarters ahead,303
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the fiscal policy disagreement index, federal government spending, the Barro-304
Redlick marginal tax rate10, total private consumption and investment, real305
GDP and the Federal Fund Rate. We use quarterly data from 1981Q3 to306
2012Q4 in real log per capita levels for all variables except those expressed307
in rates (see on-line appendix for data description).308
In order to identify fiscal news shocks inside our model, we assume that309
discretionary fiscal policy does not respond to macroeconomic variables within310
a quarter. We also assume that agents observe only lagged values of mac-311
roeconomic variables and that, in forecasting future government spending,312
they incorporate the discretionary policy response to the expected output.313
Finally, we assume that there are no shocks to future realisations of output314
not affecting its current realisation (e.g., technology or demand shocks) that315
are foreseen by the policymakers and to which the government can react.316
These assumptions allow for a recursive identification of the fiscal shocks in317
10The marginal tax rate is originally produced at the annual frequency by Barro and
Redlick (2009), based on the NBER’s TAXSIM model (see website). To generate data
at the quarterly frequency we have applied the Litterman (1983)’s random walk Markov
temporal disaggregation model - which is a refinement of Chow and Lin (1971) that allows
to avoid step changes due to serial correlation in the regression’s residuals - using as
indicators quarterly data on GDP, prices and tax receipts.
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which the fiscal variables are ordered as follow318
(Nt(0) E∗t∆GDPt Nt(1, 3) E∗t∆GDPt+4 Y ′t )′ (16)
and Yt is a vector containing the macroeconomic variables of interest. Results319
are robust to ordering expectations about future output before fiscal news320
related to future quarters.321
It is worth stressing that this ordering is consistent with the structure of322
expectation revisions delivered by models of imperfect information (see equa-323
tion 13). Indeed, the VAR structure controls for past expectations revisions324
for a given event in time, isolating the contemporaneous structural shocks325
from components due to the slow absorption of information.326
6. Disagreement and the Transmission of Fiscal Shocks327
Figure 4 reports the impulse responses to the 3-quarter ahead fiscal news328
shock, formalised in equation 11, and generated by the 11-variables TVAR329
described in equation 14. Indeed, our main objects of interest are the news330
shocks related to future changes to government spending. In fact, given the331
more extended time lag between news and the actual implementation of the332
policy change, these shocks are more likely to be affected by policy commu-333
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nication than the nowcast revisions.11 The responses are ‘intra-regime’ IRFs,334
i.e, computed assuming no transition between regimes.335
In order to facilitate the comparison between the two regimes, the impulse336
responses have been normalised to have a unitary increase in federal spend-337
ing at the 4-quarters horizon. Also, the IRFs of the variables in log-levels338
have been re-scaled by multiplying them by the average ‘Variable-to-Federal339
Spending’ ratio. In this way, the GDP, investment and consumption IRFs340
can be interpreted in ‘dollar’ terms. The impulse responses of the Federal341
Funds rate, of the marginal tax rate, and of the forecast and nowcast for342
GDP growth can be interpreted in terms of basis points change. The blue343
lines with crosses (for the low-disagreement regime, hereafter “L-D”) and red344
lines with circle markers (for the high-disagreement regime, hereafter “H-D”)345
indicate the reaction of the endogenous variables to an innovation in the346
forecast spending revision, with the shaded areas describing the evolution of347
the 68% coverage bands.348
While the response of federal spending to the policy announcement is349
similar across the two regimes, the TVAR results reveal a very different350
11The forecast revisions are also of particular interest because their time horizon is likely
to include the shocks relative to budgetary news (usually impacting a period of one year,
i.e., four quarters).
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Figure 4: Within-regime impulse responses - Impact of forecast revisions.
The shock corresponds to one standard deviation change in the revision of the
spending forecasts three quarters ahead. The responses are generated under the
assumption of constant disagreement regime. Impulse responses have been been
normalised to have a unitary increase in Federal Spending at the 4-quarters ho-
rizon. Blue crossed line and fans (68% coverage bands) are relative to the low-
disagreement regime, while the red lines with circle markers and fans (68% coverage
bands) are relative to the high disagreement regime. Sample: 1981Q3-2012Q4.
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transmission mechanism in the two regimes. The GDP response is always351
significant in the L-D regime and higher than in the H-D regime for at least352
three quarters after the shock. We also compute cumulative medium-run353
output multipliers, defined as the ratio between the sum of the GDP impulse354
responses up to the selected horizon (here, at horizon 16 quarters), and the355
corresponding sum of the responses for federal spending (see also Ilzetzki356
et al., 2013). The cumulative multiplier in the L-D regime is around 2.7,357
whereas the one in the H-D regime is around 0.5. The output multiplier358
from the linear model, averaging the two regimes, is about 1.2. The stronger359
GDP response in the L-D regime is also reflected in the impact response of360
3-quarter ahead forecast GDP, thus confirming that a fiscal shock is more361
powerful in affecting economic expectations in the L-D than in the H-D362
regime.363
The responses of the Federal Funds rate, and of total private consump-364
tion and investment, provide some evidence on the channels through which365
the two disagreement regimes are associated with a different propagation366
mechanism. While the response of private consumption is essentially the367
same in the two regimes (slightly positive on impact before becoming insig-368
nificantly different from zero), the response of private investment in the L-D369
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regime is significant and higher than the response in the H-D regime which,370
on the contrary, is never significantly different from zero. The accelerator371
effect of planned fiscal spending on investment in times characterised by less372
disagreement may be attributed to the expectation coordination effects of373
policy communication. The average marginal tax rate declines slightly in the374
medium run in the high disagreement regime, albeit it is not significantly375
different from the low disagreement regime response. The monetary policy376
stance tightens in the low disagreement case, as reflected in the more pro-377
nounced increase of the Federal Funds Rate. This may be explained by the378
willingness of the Fed to react to the potential inflationary pressure to the379
announced extra spending. This seems to reflect a response to the boost380
in demand observed following the news shock. Finally, our index of policy381
disagreement tends to decrease in the short-run after the news shock, and382
especially so in the low disagreement regime. This may be due to the release383
of information about the fiscal measure, which help to coordinate expecta-384
tions and has the effect of dissipating the disagreement built-up in the policy385
debate prior to the announcement (as can also be inferred from Figure 2).386
The evidence reported in Figure 4 highlights relevant differences between387
the responses under the two regimes, thus confirming the importance of tak-388
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ing into account the degree of disagreement about future policies when ana-389
lysing the transmission mechanism of spending shocks.12390
6.1. Exploring the Transmission Channels391
In this section, we further explore the transmission channels of the fiscal392
spending shocks in the two regimes. In particular, we complement the393
baseline model with additional variables that are added to the model fol-394
lowing a ‘marginal approach’.395
The first chart of Figure 5 shows the response of the Michigan’s Consumer396
Sentiment Index to the forecast revision. The responses in the two regimes397
are both positive on impact and in the short-run, but the response in the398
L-D regime (blue line) is somewhat higher and more persistent than that399
of the H-D regime (red line), revealing that a clearer policy communication400
tends to improve private sector confidence. This result provides evidence of401
an additional confidence channel to the transmission of fiscal shocks (see also402
Bachmann and Sims, 2012). The figure also highlights that the responses of403
both durable and non-durable consumption tend to be positive and significant404
12In the on-line appendix, we also provide results for a robustness exercise carried out
by varying the threshold level in an interval that excludes the higher and lower 30%
observations of the threshold variable, i.e., the disagreement index. These exercise shows
that the different effects stemming from the two communication regimes are confirmed
when using alternative values for the disagreement threshold.
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in the L-D regime in the short-run, whereas the H-D regime is characterised405
by a negative durable consumption response in the short-run.406
The responses of private investment’s subcomponents help to shed more407
light on the main drivers of the GDP response in the L-D regime which, as408
highlighted in Figure 4, is mostly driven by the investment component of409
GDP. As shown in Figure 5, residential fixed investment and real inventories410
are important in explaining the strong total private investment response in411
the L-D regime. At the same time, the non-residential investment responses412
appear broadly similar, and not statistically different from zero, in the two413
regimes. These results provide additional evidence of the presence of an414
accelerator effect of planned fiscal spending on investment in times charac-415
terised by less disagreement. The private sector appears to be willing to scale416
up investment and inventories to accommodate the future increase in public417
demand. The observed persistent growth of federal spending is important in418
order to explain this behaviour.13419
The response of prices, based on both CPI inflation and GDP deflator420
inflation, turns out to be similar between the two regimes: it is generally421
13An average positive response of private investment to fiscal spending announcement
is common to news-based identifications (e.g., Ricco, 2015, Forni and Gambetti, 2014 and
Ben Zeev and Pappa, 2014).
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not significantly different from zero, except in the H-D regime where the422
effect is somewhat negative after one year. A weak response of prices to the423
government spending shock is in line with related research on the US.14424
Figure 5 also shows that civilian employment tends to rise significantly in425
the L-D regime following the news shock compared to the H-D regime, which426
instead shows a drop. This is also mirrored in the unemployment response,427
which falls below zero in the low disagreement scenario. The additional de-428
mand on the labour market appears to be reflected in the upward movement429
of wages in the L-D regime. Indeed, real wages and total hours worked sig-430
nificantly rise in the short-run following the news shock in the L-D scenario,431
whereas in the H-D scenario the response of wages remains muted. This432
finding adds to the literature addressing the effects of government spend-433
ing shocks on real wages (e.g., Perotti, 2008 and Ramey, 2011). Our results434
shows that, in response to the identified news shock on government spending,435
real wages tend to rise in the short-run and especially so in the L-D regime.436
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6.2. Nonlinear Effect of Fiscal News437
Figure 6 presents the Generalised Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs)438
generated by four different shocks: a small positive fiscal shock of half stand-439
ard deviation and its symmetric negative shock (first two panels), and a large440
fiscal shock of 1.5 standard deviation and its symmetric negative shock (last441
two panels). GIRFs can help to understand how the impact on GDP may442
change in relationship to the size and sign of the shock, accounting for the443
possibility of endogenous regime shifts triggered by the propagation of the444
fiscal spending shock (which are not taken into account in the within-regime445
analysis presented in Figure 4). Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of possible re-446
gime shifts reduces the difference of the IRFs across the two regimes. A447
less clear-cut distinction between the two regimes is consistent with an endo-448
genous propagation of the information about the shock in the economy.15 It449
also emerges that negative and positive shocks are characterised by responses450
that are broadly symmetric, thus highlighting that contractionary and expan-451
sionary fiscal news have quantitatively similar effects (though, with opposite452
14For example, Dupor and Li (2013) finds little evidence of a positive response of inflation
to government expenditure shocks in the US since WWII, even during the Federal Reserve’s
passive period (1959-1979).
15The regime switching probabilities between the two regimes suggest that - in the two
years following the shock - there is a probability of around 70% to switch from the L-D
regime to the H-D one, and vice versa.
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Figure 5: Impact of forecast revisions on other variables. Impulse responses
of the Michigan’s consumer sentiment index, civilian employment and unemploy-
ment, residential fixed investment, non-residential fixed investment and inventories,
durable and non-durable consumption, real wages and hours worked, GDP deflator
and CPI inflation. IRFs have been estimated resorting to a ‘marginal approach’.
For simplicity, we report here only the impulse response of the additional vari-
able. The responses of the other variables are very similar to the baseline case,
therefore we do not report them. Blue crossed line and fans are relative to the
low-disagreement regime, while the red lines with circles and fans are relative to
the high disagreement regime. Sample: 1981Q3-2012Q4.
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Figure 6: Inter-regime impulse responses - Impact of forecast revisions.
The figure reports the GIRFs of a spending shock on GDP from four different
shocks, detailed along the y-axis, generated from the baseline 11-variables TVAR.
Blue crossed line and fans are relative to the low-disagreement regime, while the
red lines with circles and fans are relative to the high disagreement regime. Sample:
1981Q3-2012Q4.
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7. Conclusions454
This paper offers new insights into the fiscal transmission mechanism in455
the US economy by studying the role of disagreement about fiscal policy in456
the propagation of government spending shocks. The central idea is that457
disagreement about future government spending reveals poor signalling from458
the government about the future stance of fiscal policies. At the same time,459
clear fiscal policy communication can coalesce agents’ expectations, thereby460
reducing disagreement.461
Our results provide some evidence that, in times of low disagreement462
about future policies, the output response to news about future government463
spending growth is positive, strong and persistent. Conversely, periods of464
elevated disagreement are characterised by a muted output response to fiscal465
news. The stronger impact of fiscal policy when expectations are coordin-466
ated is mainly the result of the positive response of investment to news on467
fiscal spending. This channel is different from the more standard consump-468
tion accelerator effect proposed in New Keynesian models with rule of thumb469
consumers, and poses an interesting modelling challenge. Overall, our ana-470
lysis indicates that fiscal communication can be used as a forward guidance471
tool to coordinate economic agents’ expectations and thus consumption, in-472
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